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Abstract Quantum information has suggested new forms of quantum logic,
called quantum computational logics, where meanings of sentences are repre-
sented by pieces of quantum information (generally, density operators of some
Hilbert spaces), which can be stored and transmitted by means of quantum
particles. This approach can be applied to a semantic characterization of epis-
temic logical operations, which may occur in sentences like “At time t′ Bob
knows that at time t Alice knows that the spin-value is up”. Each epistemic
agent (say, Alice, Bob,...) has a characteristic truth-perspective, corresponding
to a particular orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space C2. From a physical
point of view, a truth-perspective can be associated to an apparatus that
allows one to measure a given observable. An important feature that char-
acterizes the knowledge of any agent is the amount of information that is
accessible to him/her (technically, a special set of density operators, which
also represents the internal memory of the agent in question). One can prove
that interesting epistemic operations are special examples of quantum chan-
nels, which generally are not unitary. The act of knowing may involve some
intrinsic irreversibility due to possible measurement-procedures or to a loss
of information about the environment. We also illustrate some relativistic-like
effects that arise in the behavior of epistemic agents.
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1 Introduction
Quantum information has recently suggested new problems and new investiga-
tions in logic. An interesting example concerns an abstract theory of epistemic
logical operations (like “to know”) developed in a Hilbert space environment
[1,4]. Most standard approaches to epistemic logics have proposed a quite
strong characterization of epistemic operations. In such frameworks knowledge
is generally modelled as a potential rather than an actual knowledge. Accord-
ingly, a sentence like “Alice knows that the spin-value in the x-direction is up”
turns out to have the meaning “Alice could know” rather than “Alice actually
knows”. A consequence of these theories is the unrealistic phenomenon of log-
ical omniscience according to which whenever Alice knows a given sentence,
then Alice knows all the logical consequences thereof. Hence, for instance,
knowing the axioms of Euclidean geometry should imply knowing all the the-
orems of the theory.
A more realistic logical theory of knowledge can be developed in the frame-
work of quantum computational logics [6], which are new forms of quantum
logic suggested by the theory of quantum logical gates in quantum computa-
tion. The basic ideas that underly the semantic characterization of these logics
can be sketched as follows. Pieces of quantum information (mathematically
represented by density operators of convenient Hilbert spaces) are regarded as
possible meanings for the sentences of a given formal language. At the same
time, the basic logical connectives of this language are interpreted as particu-
lar quantum logical gates: unitary quantum operations that transform density
operators in a reversible way. Accordingly, any sentence can be imagined as a
synthetic logical description of a quantum circuit.
Is it possible and interesting to describe logical epistemic operations (say,
“At time t Alice knows”) as a special kind of quantum operation? We give a
positive answer to this question. The intuitive idea is the following: whenever
ρ represents a piece of quantum information (for instance the qubit |1〉), the
operation Kat (say, “At time t Alice knows”) transforms ρ into another piece
of quantum information Katρ, which lives in the same space of ρ and asserts
that “At time t Alice knows ρ”. Of course, generally, Katρ and ρ will be
different density operators. On this basis, one can study the behavior of nested
epistemic operations, like “At time t′ Bob knows that at time t Alice knows
ρ” (Kbt′Katρ).
Like any quantum information, also epistemic pieces of information (say,
Katρ) may be true or false or indeterminate, where truth-values are defined
in terms of a natural notion of quantum probability. Conventionally, one can
assume that the two elements |1〉 and |0〉 of the canonical orthonormal basis of
the Hilbert space C2 represent in this framework the truth-values Truth and
Falsity. Accordingly (by application of the Born-rule), the probability of being
true for a generic qubit |ψ〉 = a0|0〉+ a1|1〉 will be the number p(|ψ〉) = |a1|2.
The definition of Born-like probabilities can be canonically extended to all
density operators, living in any product-space C2 ⊗ . . .⊗ C2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
.
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The choice of an orthonormal basis for the space C2 is, obviously, a matter
of convention. One can consider infinitely many bases that are determined
by the application of a unitary operator T to the elements of the canonical
basis. From an intuitive point of view, we can think that the operator T gives
rise to a change of truth-perspective. While the canonical truth-perspective is
identified with the pair of bits |1〉 and |0〉, in the T-truth perspective Truth
and Falsity are identified with the two qubits T|1〉 and T|0〉, respectively. In
this framework, it is not strange to guess that different epistemic agents may
have different truth-perspectives, corresponding to different ideas of Truth and
Falsity.
From a physical point of view, each truth-perspective can be naturally
regarded as associated to a physical apparatus that allows one to measure a
given observable. As an example, consider a source emitting a pair of photons
correlated in polarization in such a way that both photons have the same
polarization (say, the horizontal polarization |H〉 or the vertical polarization
|V 〉). Suppose that the two photons are in the entangled state
|ψ〉 = a|H,H〉+ b|V, V 〉
(with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1). The orthonormal basis B = {|H〉, |V 〉} represents here
a particular truth-perspective. Let us refer to an observer equipped with a
polarizer that detects 45o and 135o polarized photons. The same state |ψ〉
will be represented by the observer from a different truth-perspective, corre-
sponding to the orthonormal basis B′ = {|45〉, |135〉}. In fact, by applying the
transformation
|H〉 = 1√
2
(|45〉 − |135〉); |V 〉 = 1√
2
(|45〉+ |135〉),
the observer will describe the state |ψ〉 as
|ψ〉 = a+ b
2
(|45, 45〉+ |135, 135〉)− a− b
2
(|45, 135〉+ |135, 45〉).
Notice that a truth-perspective change gives rise to a different description of
one and the same physical state |ψ〉.
An important feature that characterizes the knowledge of any agent is
represented by the amount of information that is accessible to him/her. Tech-
nically, the epistemic domain of an agent can be identified with a special set
of density operators. From an intuitive point of view, this set can be regarded
as the set of pieces of information that our agent is able to understand and
to memorize. And the limits of epistemic domains can be used to avoid the
unpleasant phenomenon of logical omniscience. One can prove that epistemic
operations are not generally unitary. From an intuitive point of view, the
act of knowing seems to involve some intrinsic irreversibility due to possible
measurement-procedures or to a loss of information about the environment.
In Section 4 we will see how quantum channels are deeply connected with
epistemic operations: special examples of irreversible quantum operations that
can be used to reach the information stored by density operators. Finally we
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will also illustrate some relativistic-like effects that arise in the behavior of
epistemic agents.
An abstract study of epistemic operations in a Hilbert-space environment
may have a double interest:
1. from a logical point of view such analysis shows how “thinking in a quantum-
theoretic way” can contribute to overcome some crucial difficulties of stan-
dard epistemic logics.
2. From a physical point of view this analysis stimulates further investigations
about possible correlations between the irreversibility of quantum opera-
tions and the kind of “jumps” that seem to characterize acts of knowledge,
both in the case of human and of artificial intelligence.
2 Truth-perspectives and quantum logical gates
The general mathematical environment is the n-fold tensor product of the
Hilbert space C2:
H(n) := C2 ⊗ . . .⊗ C2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
,
where all pieces of quantum information live. The elements |1〉 = (0, 1) and
|0〉 = (1, 0) of the canonical orthonormal basis B(1) of C2 represent, in this
framework, the two classical bits, which can be also regarded as the canonical
truth-values Truth and Falsity, respectively. The canonical basis of H(n) is the
set
B(n) =
{
|x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |xn〉 : |x1〉, . . . , |xn〉 ∈ B(1)
}
.
As usual, we will briefly write |x1, . . . , xn〉 instead of |x1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |xn〉. By
definition, a quregister is a unit vector of H(n). Quregisters thus correspond
to pure states, namely to maximal pieces of information about the quantum
systems that are supposed to store a given amount of quantum information.
We shall also make reference to mixtures of quregisters, represented by den-
sity operators ρ of H(n). Of course, quregisters correspond to special cases of
density operators. We will denote by D(H(n)) the set of all density operators
of H(n), while D = ⋃n {D(H(n))} will represent the set of all possible pieces
of quantum information.
As observed in the Introduction, from an intuitive point of view, a basis-
change in C2 can be regarded as a change of truth-perspective. While in the
classical case, the truth-values Truth and Falsity are identified with the two
classical bits |1〉 and |0〉, assuming a different basis corresponds to a different
idea of Truth and Falsity. Since any basis-change in C2 is determined by a
unitary operator, we can identify a truth-perspective with a unitary operator
T of C2. We will write:
|1T〉 = T|1〉; |0T〉 = T|0〉,
and we will assume that |1T〉 and |0T〉 represent, respectively, the truth-values
Truth and Falsity of the truth-perspective T. The canonical truth-perspective
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is, of course, determined by the identity operator I of C2. We will indicate
by B
(1)
T the orthonormal basis determined by T; while B
(1)
I will represent the
canonical basis.
Any unitary operator T of H(1) can be naturally extended to a unitary
operator T(n) of H(n) (for any n ≥ 1):
T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 = T|x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ T|xn〉.
Accordingly, any choice of a unitary operator T of H(1) determines an
orthonormal basis B
(n)
T for H(n) such that:
B
(n)
T =
{
T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 : |x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ B(n)I
}
.
Instead of T(n)|x1, . . . , xn〉 we will also write |x1T , . . . , xnT〉.
The elements of B
(1)
T will be called the T-bits of H(1); while the elements
of B
(n)
T will represent the T-registers of H(n).
On this ground the notions of truth, falsity and probability with respect to
any truth-perspective T can be defined in a natural way.
Definition 1 (T-true and T-false registers)
– |x1T , . . . , xnT〉 is a T-true register iff |xnT〉 = |1T〉;
– |x1T , . . . , xnT〉 is a T-false register iff |xnT〉 = |0T〉.
In other words, the T-truth-value of a T-register (which corresponds to a
sequence of T-bits) is determined by its last element. 1
Definition 2 (T-truth and T-falsity)
– The T-truth of H(n) is the projection operator TP (n)1 that projects over the
closed subspace spanned by the set of all T- true registers;
– the T-falsity of H(n) is the projection operator TP (n)0 that projects over
the closed subspace spanned by the set of all T- false registers.
In this way, truth and falsity are dealt with as mathematical representatives
of possible physical properties. Accordingly, by applying the Born-rule, one can
naturally define the probability-value of any density operator with respect to
the truth-perspective T.
Definition 3 (T-Probability)
For any ρ ∈ D(H(n)),
pT(ρ) := Tr(
TP
(n)
1 ρ),
where Tr is the trace-functional.
1 As we will see, the application of a classical reversible gate to a register |x1, . . . , xn〉
transforms the (canonical) bit |xn〉 into the target-bit |x′n〉, which behaves as the final
truth-value. This justifies our choice in Definition 1.
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We interpret pT(ρ) as the probability that the information ρ satisfies the T-
Truth.
In the particular case of qubits, we will obviously obtain:
pT(a0|0T〉+ a1|1T〉) = |a1|2.
Two truth-perspectives T1 and T2 are called probabilistically equivalent iff for
any density operator ρ, pT1(ρ) = pT2(ρ).
For any choice of a truth-perspective T, the set D of all density operators
can be pre-ordered by a relation that is defined in terms of the probability-
function pT.
Definition 4 (Preorder)
ρ T σ iff pT(ρ) ≤ pT(σ).
This preorder relation plays an important role in the semantics of quantum
computational logics. For, the logical consequence-relation between sentences
is defined in terms of T (see Section 4).
As is well known, quantum information is processed by quantum logical
gates (briefly, gates): unitary operators that transform quregisters into qureg-
isters in a reversible way.
In this article we will consider some well known quantum gates [7]: the
negation NOT(n), the Toffoli gate T(n,m,p), the controlled-not gate XOR(n,m), the
Hadamard-gate
√
I
(n)
and the square root of the negation
√
NOT
(n)
, that play
a special role both from the computational and from the logical point of view.
All gates can be naturally transposed from the canonical truth-perspective
to any truth-perspective T. Let G(n) be any gate defined with respect to the
canonical truth-perspective. The twin-gate G
(n)
T , defined with respect to the
truth-perspective T, is determined as follows:
G
(n)
T := T
(n)G(n)T(n)†,
where T† is the adjoint of T.
All T-gates, defined on H(n), can be canonically extended to the set of all
density operators ofH(n). LetGT be any gate defined onH(n). The correspond-
ing unitary quantum operation DGT is defined as follows for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)):
DGTρ = GT ρG
†
T.
It is interesting to consider a convenient notion of distance between truth-
perspectives. As is well known, different definitions of distance between vectors
can be found in the literature. For our aims it is convenient to adopt the
Fubini-Study definition of distance between two qubits.
Definition 5 (The Fubini-Study distance)
Let |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 be two qubits.
d(|ψ〉, |ϕ〉) = 2
pi
arccos |〈ψ|ϕ〉|.
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This notion of distance satisfies the following conditions:
1. d(|ψ〉, |ϕ〉) is a metric distance;
2. |ψ〉 ⊥ |ϕ〉 ⇒ d(|ψ〉, |ϕ〉) = 1;
3. d(|1〉, |1Bell〉) = 12 , where |1〉 is the canonical truth, while |1Bell〉 =
√
I
(1)|1〉 =(
1√
2
,− 1√
2
)
represents the Bell-truth (which corresponds to a maximal un-
certainty with respect to the canonical truth).
On this ground, one can naturally define the epistemic distance between
two truth-perspectives.
Definition 6 (Epistemic distance)
Let T1 and T2 be two truth-perspectives.
dEp(T1,T2) = d(|1T1〉, |1T2〉).
In other words, the epistemic distance between the truth-perspectives T1
and T2 is identified with the distance between the two qubits that represent
the truth-value Truth in T1 and in T2, respectively.
3 Epistemic operations and epistemic structures
We will now introduce the concepts of (logical) epistemic operation and of
epistemic structure.
Definition 7 ((Logical) epistemic operation and strong epistemic operation)
A (logical) epistemic operation of the space H(n) with respect to the truth-
perspective T is a map
E
(n)
T : B(H(n)) 7→ B(H(n)),
where B(H(n)) is the set of all bounded operators of H(n). The following con-
ditions are required:
1. E
(n)
T is associated with an epistemic domain EpD(E
(n)
T ), which is a subset
of D(H(n));
2. for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)), E(n)T ρ ∈ D(H(n));
3. ∀ρ ∈ D(H(n)) : ρ /∈ EpD(E(n)T ) ⇒ E(n)T ρ = ρ0 (where ρ0 is a fixed density
operator of D(H(n))).
An epistemic operation E
(n)
T is called strong iff E
(n)
T ρ T ρ, for any ρ ∈
EpD(ET) (where T is the preorder relation defined by Def.4).
As expected, an intuitive interpretation of E
(n)
T ρ is the following: “the piece of
information ρ is known/believed”. The strong epistemic operation described
by E
(n)
T is limited by a given epistemic domain (which is intended to represent
the information accessible to a given agent, or also his/her memory, relatively
to the space H(n)). Whenever a piece of information ρ does not belong to
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the epistemic domain of E
(n)
T , then E
(n)
T ρ collapses into a fixed element ρ0
(which may be identified, for instance, with the maximally uncertain informa-
tion 12n I
(n) or with the T-Falsity 12n−1
TP
(n)
0 ). At the same time, whenever ρ
belongs to the epistemic domain of E
(n)
T , it seems reasonable to assume that
the probability-values of ρ and E
(n)
T ρ are correlated: the probability of the
quantum information asserting that “ρ is known/believed” should always be
less than or equal to the probability of ρ. Hence, in particular, we have:
pT(E
(n)
T ρ) = 1 ⇒ pT(ρ) = 1.
But generally, not the other way around! In other words, pieces of quantum
information that are certainly known are certainly true (with respect to the
truth-perspective in question).
A strong epistemic operation E
(n)
T is called non-trivial iff for at least one
density operator ρ ∈ EpD(E(n)T ), pT(E(n)T ρ) < pT(ρ). Notice that strong epis-
temic operations do not generally preserve pure states [1,2,3].
One can prove that non-trivial epistemic operations cannot be represented
by unitary quantum operations, being generally irreversible [1]. Their behavior
is, in a sense, similar to the behavior of measurement-operations.
At the same time, some interesting epistemic operations can be represented
by the more general notion of quantum channel defined below. 2
Definition 8 (Quantum channel) 3
A quantum channel on H(n) is a linear map E(n) from B(H(n)) to B(H(n))
such that for some set I of indices there exists a set {Ei}i∈I of elements of
B(H(n)) satisfying the following conditions:
1.
∑
iE
†
iEi = I
(n);
2. ∀A ∈ B(H(n)) : E(n)(A) = ∑iEiAE†i .
A set {Ei}i∈I such that
∑
iE
†
iEi = I
(n) is usually called a system of
Kraus operators. One can prove that quantum channels are trace-preserving,
and hence transform density operators into density operators.
Of course, unitary quantum operations DG(n) are special cases of quantum
channels, for which {Ei}i∈I =
{
G(n)
}
. As expected, quantum channels can be
defined with respect to any truth-perspective T.
We define now some possible properties of epistemic operations that have
a significant logical interest. One is dealing with strong conditions that are
generally violated in the real use of our intuitive notion of knowledge.
2 Quantum channels represent particular cases of quantum operations. The concept of
quantum operation is a quite general notion that permits us to represent at the same time
symmetry transformations of quantum states, effects and measurements. In particular, it
has been shown that for open systems, interacting with an environment, the Schro¨dinger-
equation should be generalized to a superoperator-equation, describing how an initial pure
state evolves into a mixed state, transformation that has the form of a quantum operation.
See, for instance,[5],[8].
3 This definition is based on the so called Kraus first representation theorem. See [9].
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Definition 9 (Introspection, consistency and monotonicity)
A strong epistemic operation E
(n)
T ofH(n) (with respect to the truth-perspective
T) is called
1. positively introspective iff for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)) :
pT(E
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(E(n)T E(n)T ρ).
In other words, whenever we know/believe we know/believe that we know/believe.
2. Negatively introspective iff for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)) :
pT(
DNOTTE
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(E(n)T DNOTTE(n)T ρ).
In other words, whenever we do not know/believe we know/believe that
we do not know/believe.
3. Probabilistically consistent iff for any ρ ∈ D(H(n)) :
pT(E
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(DNOTTE(n)T DNOTTρ).
In other words, whenever we know/believe an information we do not know/believe
its negation.
4. monotonic iff for any ρ, σ ∈ D(H(n)) :
pT(ρ) ≤ pT(σ) ⇒ pT(E(n)T ρ) ≤ pT(E(n)T σ).
Using the concepts defined above, we can finally introduce the notion of
epistemic quantum computational structure. From an intuitive point of view,
an epistemic quantum computational structure can be described as a system
consisting of a set of epistemic agents evolving in time (where time is dealt
with as a finite sequence of instants (t1, . . . , tn)). Each agent a is characterized
by a truth-perspective Ta, which (for the sake of simplicity) is supposed to be
constant in time. At any time t and for any Hilbert space H(n), each agent
is associated to a strong epistemic operation E
(n)
Ta,at
, whose epistemic domain
represents the amount of information that our agent is able to understand
and to memorize at that particular time (relatively to the space H(n)). When
ρ belongs to the epistemic domain of E
(n)
Ta,at
, then the number pTa(E
(n)
Ta,at
ρ)
represents the probability that agent a at time t knows/believes the quantum
information ρ.
Definition 10 (Epistemic quantum computational structure)
An epistemic quantum computational structure is a system
S = (T, Ag, TrPersp, Inf , U, B, K),
where:
1. T is a time-sequence (t1, . . . , tn);
2. Ag is a set of epistemic agents where each agent a is represented as a
function of the time t in T . We will write at instead of a(t);
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3. TrPersp is a map that assigns to any agent a a truth-perspective Ta (the
truth-perspective of a);
4. Inf is a map that assigns to any at and to any n ≥ 1 a map, called (logical)
information operation
Inf
(n)
Ta,at
: B(H(n)) 7→ B(H(n)),
which is an epistemic operation with respect to the truth-perspective Ta
(the truth-perspective of agent a).
5. U is a map that assigns to any at and to any n ≥ 1 a map, called (logical)
understandig operation
U
(n)
Ta,at
: B(H(n)) 7→ B(H(n)),
which is an epistemic operation with respect to the truth-perspective Ta.
6. B is a map that assigns to any at and to any n ≥ 1 a map, called (logical)
belief operation
B
(n)
Ta,at
: B(H(n)) 7→ B(H(n)),
which is a strong epistemic operation with respect to the truth-perspective
Ta.
7. K is a map that assigns to any at and to any n ≥ 1 a map, called (logical)
knowledge operation
K
(n)
Ta,at
: B(H(n)) 7→ B(H(n)),
which is a strong epistemic operation with respect to the truth-perspective
Ta. The following conditions are required:
(i) K
(n)
Ta,at
ρ T B(n)Ta,atρ, for any ρ ∈ EpD(K
(n)
Ta,at
);
(ii) B
(n)
Ta,at
ρ T U(n)Ta,atρ, for any ρ ∈ EpD(B
(n)
Ta,at
) (where T is the
preorder relation defined by Def.4);
(iii) EpD(K
(n)
Ta,at
) ⊆ EpD(B(n)Ta,at) ⊆ EpD(U
(n)
Ta,at
) ⊆ EpD(Inf (n)Ta,at).
From an epistemic point of view, an agent can be certain to have an uncertain
information and vice versa.
4 Quantum noise channels as epistemic operations
We will now illustrate some examples of strong epistemic operations that may
be interesting from a physical point of view. One is dealing with special cases of
quantum noise channels, which can be, generally, obtained from some unitary
operators, tracing out the ancillary qubits that describe the environment.
Let α, β, γ be complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 + |γ|2 ≤ 1. Consider
the following system of Kraus operators:
E0 =
√
1− |α|2 − |β|2 − |γ|2 I
E1 = |α|σx
E2 = |β|σy
E3 = |γ|σz
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(where σx, σy, σz are the three Pauli matrices).
Define α,β,γE(1) as follows for any ρ ∈ D(C2):
α,β,γE(1)ρ =
3∑
i=0
Ei ρE
†
i .
We have:
α,β,γE(1)ρ = (1− |α|2 − |β|2 − |γ|2)ρ+ |α|2σxρσx + |β|2σyρσy + |γ|2σzρσz
One can prove that for any choice of α, β, γ (such that |α|2+|β|2+|γ|2 ≤ 1),
the map α,β,γE(1) is a quantum channel of the space C2.
Let us refer to the Bloch-sphere corresponding to D(C2). Any map α,β,γE(1)
induces the following vector-transformation (the sphere is deformed into an
ellipsoid centered at the origin):xy
z
 7→
 (1− 2|β|2 − 2|γ|2) x(1− 2|α|2 − 2|γ|2) y
(1− 2|α|2 − 2|β|2) z

For particular choices of α, β and γ, one obtains some special cases of
quantum channels.
– For α = β = γ = 0, one obtains the identity operator.
– For β = γ = 0, one obtains the bit-flip channel αBF (1) that flips the two
canonical bits (represented as the projection operators IP
(1)
0 and
IP
(1)
1 )
with probability |α|2:
IP
(1)
0 7→ (1− |α|2) IP (1)0 + (|α|2) IP (1)1 ;
IP
(1)
1 7→ (1− |α|2) IP (1)1 + (|α|2) IP (1)0 .
The sphere is mapped into an ellipsoid with x as symmetry-axis
– For α = γ = 0, one obtains the bit-phase-flip channel βBPF (1) that flips
both bits and phase with probability |β|2. The sphere is mapped into an
ellipsoid with y as symmetry-axis.
– For α = β = 0, one obtains the phase-flip channel γPF (1) that flips the
phase with probability |γ|2. The sphere is mapped into an ellipsoid with z
as symmetry-axis.
– For |α|2 = |β|2 = |γ|2 = p4 , one obtains the depolarizing channel pD(1).
If p = 1, the polarization along any direction is equal to 0. The sphere is
contracted by a factor 1− p and the center of the sphere is a fixed point.
Another interesting example is the generalized amplitude damping AD(1)
induced by the following system of Kraus-operators:
E0 =
√
λ
(
1 0
0
√
1− p
)
E2 =
√
1− λ
(√
1− p 0
0 1
)
E1 =
√
λ
(
0
√
p
0 0
)
E3 =
√
1− λ
(
0 0√
p 0
)
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where λ, p ∈ [0, 1].
This channel determines the following transformation on the Bloch-sphere (see
Fig. 1): xy
z
 7→
√1− p x√1− p y
(1− p) z + p(2λ− 1)

Fig. 1 The amplitude damping channel
The channels we have considered above have been defined with respect
to the canonical truth-perspective I. However, as expected, they can be nat-
urally transposed to any truth-perspective T. Given E(1) such that E(1)ρ =∑3
i=0Ei ρE
†
i , the twin-channel E(1)T of E(1) can be defined as follows:
E(1)T ρ :=
∑
i
TEiT
† ρTE†iT
†.
So far we have only considered quantum channels of the space C2. At the
same time, any operation E(1)T (defined on C2) can be canonically extended
to an operation E(n)T defined on the space H(n) (for any n > 1). Consider a
density operator ρ of H(n) and let Redn(ρ) represent the reduced state of the
n-th subsystem of ρ. We have: pT(ρ) = Tr(
TP
(1)
1 Red
n(ρ)). In other words, the
T-probability of ρ only depends on the T-probability of the n-th subsystem of
ρ. On this basis, it is reasonable to define E(n)T as follows:
E(n)T = I(n−1) ⊗ E(1)T .
Notice that, generally, a quantum channel E(n) does not represent a strong
epistemic operation. We may have, for a ρ (which is supposed to belong to the
epistemic domain):
pI(
αBF (1)ρ)  pI(ρ),
against the definition of strong epistemic operation.
At the same time, by convenient choices of the epistemic domains, our
quantum channels can be transformed into strong epistemic operations.
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Definition 11 (A bit-flip epistemic operation αKBF
(n)
T )
Let α 6= 0. Define αKBF(n)T as follows:
1. EpD(αKBF
(n)
T ) ⊆ D = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 12}.
In other words an agent (whose strong epistemic operation is αKBF
(n)
T )
only understands pieces of information that are not “too far from the
truth”.
2. ρ ∈ EpD(αKBF(n)T ) ⇒ αKBF(n)T ρ = αBF (n)T ρ.
Theorem 1 [7]
(i) Any αKBF
(n)
T is a strong epistemic operation. In particular,
αKBF
(n)
T is a
non-trivial epistemic operation if there exists at least one ρ ∈ EpD(αKBF(n)T )
such that pT(ρ) >
1
2 .
(ii) the set D is the maximal set such that the corresponding αKBF
(n)
T is a
strong epistemic operation.
(iii) Let |α|2 ≤ 12 and let EpD(αKBF(n)T ) = D. The following closure property
holds: for any ρ ∈ D, αKBF(n)T ρ ∈ D.
In a similar way one can define strong epistemic operations that correspond
to the phase-flip channel, the bit-phase-flip channel, the depolarizing channel
and the generalized amplitude-damping channel.
Definition 12 (A phase-flip epistemic operation γKPF
(n)
T )
Let γ 6= 0. Define γKPF(n)T as follows:
1. EpD(γKPF
(n)
T ) ⊆ D(H(n)).
2. ρ ∈ EpD(γKPF(n)T ) ⇒ γKPF(n)T ρ = γPF (n)T ρ.
Theorem 2
pT(
γKPF
(n)
T ρ) = pT(ρ), for any ρ ∈ EpD(γKPF(n)T ).
Hence, γKPF
(n)
T is a trivial epistemic operation.
Proof (i)-(ii) Suppose ρ ∈ EpD(γKPF(n)T ) ⊆ D(H(n)). Let us consider T†Redn(ρ)T =
1
2 (I + xσx + yσy + zσz). We have, pT(
γKPF
(n)
T ρ) = Tr(
TP
(n)
1
γKPF
(n)
T ρ) = Tr(
IP
(1)
1
∑
iEiT
†Redn(ρ)TE†i ) =
1−z
2 = pT(ρ).
Definition 13 (A bit-phase-flip epistemic operation βKBPF
(n)
T )
Let β 6= 0. Define βKBPF(n)T as follows:
1. EpD(βKBPF
(n)
T ) ⊆ D = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 12}.
2. ρ ∈ EpD(βKBPF(n)T ) ⇒ βKBPF(n)T ρ = βBPF (n)T ρ.
Theorem 3
(i) Any βKBPF
(n)
T is a strong epistemic operation. In particular,
βKBPF
(n)
T
is a non-trivial epistemic operation if there exists at least one ρ ∈ EpD(βKBPF(n)T )
such that pT(ρ) >
1
2 .
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(ii) the set D is the maximal set such that the corresponding βKBPF
(n)
T is a
strong epistemic operation.
(iii) Let |β|2 ≤ 12 and let EpD(βKBPF(n)T ) = D. The following closure property
holds: for any ρ ∈ D, αKBF(n)T ρ ∈ D.
Proof
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Definition 14 (A depolarizing epistemic operation pKD
(n)
T )
Let p 6= 0. Define pKD(n)T as follows:
1. EpD(pKD
(n)
T ) ⊆ D = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 12}.
2. ρ ∈ EpD(pKD(n)T ) ⇒ pKD(n)T ρ = pD(n)T ρ.
Notice that for any truth-perspectives T, pD(n)T = pD(n)I .
Theorem 4
(i) Any pKD
(n)
T is a strong epistemic operation. In particular,
pKD
(n)
T is a
non-trivial epistemic operation if there exists at least one ρ ∈ EpD(pKD(n)T )
such that pT(ρ) >
1
2 .
(ii) the set D is the maximal set such that the corresponding pKD
(n)
T is a strong
epistemic operation.
(iii) Let EpD(pKD
(n)
T ) = D. Then, for any ρ ∈ EpD(pKD(n)T ), we have:
pKD
(n)
T ρ ∈ EpD(pKD(n)T ).
Proof (i)-(ii) Suppose ρ ∈ EpD(pKD(n)T ) ⊆ D. Let us consider T†Redn(ρ)T =
1
2 (I+xσx+yσy+zσz). We have, pT(
pKD
(n)
T ρ) =
1−(1−p)z
2 . Hence,
pKD
(n)
T ρ T
ρ ⇔ (1 − p)z ≥ z ⇔ z ∈ [−1, 0] ⇔ pT(ρ) ≥ 12 . Thus, pKD(n)T is an epistemic
operation.
(iii) pT(
pKD
(n)
T ρ) =
1−(1−p)z
2 ≥ 12 , since z ∈ [−1, 0].
Definition 15 (A generalized amplitude-damping epistemic operation p,λKAD
(n)
T )
Let p, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Define p,λKAD(n)T as follows:
1. EpD(p,λKAD
(n)
T ) ⊆ AD = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 1− λ}.
2. ρ ∈ EpD(p,λKAD(n)T ) ⇒ p,λKAD(n)T ρ = p,λAD(n)T ρ.
Theorem 5
(i) Any p,λKAD
(n)
T is a strong epistemic operation. In particular,
p,λKAD
(n)
T
is a non-trivial epistemic operation if there exists at least one ρ ∈ EpD(p,λKAD(n)T )
such that pT(ρ) > 1− λ.
(ii) the set AD is the maximal set such that the corresponding p,λKAD
(n)
T is
a strong epistemic operation.
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(iii) Let EpD(p,λKAD
(n)
T ) = AD. Then, for any ρ ∈ EpD(p,λKAD(n)T ), we
have: p,λKAD
(n)
T ρ ∈ EpD(p,λKAD(n)T ).
Proof (i)-(ii) Suppose ρ ∈ EpD(p,λKAD(n)T ) ⊆ AD. Let us consider T†Redn(ρ)T =
1
2 (I+xσx+yσy+zσz). We have, pT(
p,λKAD
(n)
T ρ) =
1−(1−p)z−p(2λ−1)
2 . Hence,
p,λKAD
(n)
T ρ T ρ⇔ (1− p)z+ p(2λ− 1) ≥ z ⇔ 2λ− 1 ≥ z ⇔ pT(ρ) ≥ 1−λ.
Thus, p,λKAD
(n)
T is a strong epistemic operation.
(iii) pT(
p,λKAD
(n)
T ρ) =
1−(1−p)z−p(2λ−1)
2 ≥ 1− λ, since 2λ− 1 ≥ z.
The following theorem sums up some interesting properties of the strong
epistemic operations defined above.
Theorem 6
(i) All strong epistemic operations αKBF
(n)
T ,
γKPF
(n)
T ,
βKBPF
(n)
T ,
pKD
(n)
T
are probabilistically consistent.
(ii) All strong epistemic operations p,λKAD
(n)
T with λ ≥ 12 are probabilistically
consistent.
(iii) All strong epistemic operations γKPF
(n)
T are monotonic, positively and
negatively introspective.
(iv) All strong epistemic operations αKBF
(n)
T (with |α|2 ≤ 12), βKBPF(n)T
(with |β|2 ≤ 12), pKD(n)T , whose epistemic domain is a subset of D =
{ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 12} are monotonic.
(v) All strong epistemic operations p,λKAD
(n)
T whose epistemic domain is a
subset of AD = {ρ ∈ D(H(n)) | pT(ρ) ≥ 1− λ} are monotonic.
Proof
Let K
(n)
T ∈
{
αKBF
(n)
T ,
γ KPF
(n)
T ,
β KBPF
(n)
T ,
p KD
(n)
T
}
and suppose that K
(n)
T
is induced by the following Kraus operators:
E0 =
√
1− |α|2 − |β|2 − |γ|2 I; E1 = |α|σx; E2 = |β|σy; E3 = |γ|σz.
Assume that the fixed element ρ0 of our epistemic operations is
TP
(n)
0 .
For any ρ, ρ′ ∈ D(H(n)), we can write:
T†Redn(ρ)T = 12 (I + xσx + yσy + zσz);
T†Redn(ρ′)T = 12 (I + x
′σx + y′σy + z′σz).
(i) Let ρ ∈ D(H(n)). We have:
ρ 6∈ EpD(K(n)T ) ⇒ pT(K(n)T ρ) = 0;
DNOTTρ 6∈ EpD(K(n)T ) ⇒ pT(DNOTTK(n)T DNOTTρ) = 1.
Otherwise, we obtain:
pT(
DNOTTK
(n)
T
DNOTTρ) =
Tr( IP
(1)
1 NOT
(1)
∑
i(EiNOT
(1)T†Redn(ρ)TNOT(1)E†i )NOT
(1)) = 1−(1−2|α|
2−2|β|2)z
2 =
pT(K
(n)
T ρ).
Consequently: pT(K
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(DNOTTK(n)T DNOTTρ).
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(ii) Similarly.
(iii) By Theorem 2.
(iv) Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ EpD(K(n)T ). Suppose that |α|2 + |β|2 = 12 . Then we have:
pT(K
(n)
T ρ) = pT(K
(n)
T ρ
′) = 12 . Otherwise we obtain:
pT(K
(n)
T ρ) ≤ pT(K(n)T ρ′) ⇔ 1−(1−2|α|
2−2|β|2)z
2 ≤ 1−(1−2|α|
2−2|β|2)z′
2 ⇔
1−z
2 ≤ 1−z
′
2 ⇔ pT(ρ) ≤ pT(ρ′).
(v) Similarly.
Notice that in the general case the monotonicity-property can be violated
by strong epistemic operations. In fact, the following situation is possible:
– ρ T σ;
– ρ ∈ EpD(K(n)T ); σ /∈ EpD(K(n)T );
– K
(n)
T ρ T K
(n)
T σ.
Generally, the strong epistemic operations αKBF
(n)
T ,
βKBPF
(n)
T ,
pKD
(n)
T ,
p,λKAD
(n)
T are neither positively introspective nor negatively introspective.
Suppose, for example, that EpD(K
(n)
T ) = {K(n)T TP (n)1 , TP (n)1 }, where
K
(n)
T ∈ {αKBF(n)T , βKBPF(n)T , pKD(n)T , p,λKAD(n)T }.
By definition of K
(n)
T we have for any ρ ∈ EpD(K(n)T ): pT(K(n)T ρ) < pT(ρ).
Hence, pT(K
(n)
T
TP
(n)
1 ) > pT(K
(n)
T K
(n)
T
TP
(n)
1 ). Thus, K
(n)
T is not positively in-
trospective. Suppose then that EpD(K
(n)
T ) = {DNOTTK(n)T TP (n)0 }. We have:
pT(
DNOTTK
(n)
T
TP
(n)
0 ) > pT(K
(n)
T
DNOTTK
(n)
T
TP
(n)
0 ), where K
(n)
T
TP
(n)
0 =
TP
(n)
0 .
Thus, K
(n)
T is not negatively introspective.
Truth-perspectives are, in a sense, similar to different frames of reference in
relativity. Accordingly, one could try and apply a “relativistic” way of thinking
in order to describe how a given agent can “see” the logical behavior of another
agent.
As expected, the logical behavior of any agent turns out to depend, in this
framework, on two factors:
– his/her idea of Truth and Falsity ;
– his/her choice of the gates that correspond to the basic logical operations.
Both these factors are, of course, determined by the agent’s truth-perspective
T.
As an example let us refer to two agents Alice and Bob, whose truth-
perspectives are TAlice and TBob, respectively. Let {|1Alice〉, |0Alice〉} and {|1Bob〉,
|0Bob〉} represent the systems of truth-values of our two agents. Furthermore,
for any canonical gate DG(n) (defined with respect to the canonical truth-
perspective I), let DG
(n)
Alice and
DG
(n)
Bob represent the corresponding twin-gates
for Alice and for Bob, respectively.
According to the rule assumed in Section 2, we have:
DG
(n)
Alice =
D(T
(n)
AliceG
(n)T
(n)†
Alice).
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In a similar way in the case of Bob.
We will adopt the following conventional terminology.
– When |1Bob〉 = a0|0Alice〉+a1|1Alice〉, we will say that Alice sees that Bob’s
Truth is a0|0Alice〉+ a1|1Alice〉. In a similar way, for Bob’s Falsity.
– When DG
(n)
Alice =
D(T
(n)
AliceG
(n)T
(n)†
Alice) and
DG
(n)
Bob =
D(T
(n)
BobG
(n)T
(n)†
Bob ) =
DG
(n)
1Alice
(where DG(n) and DG
(n)
1Alice
are canonical gates), we will say that
Alice sees Bob using the gate DG
(n)
1Alice
in place of her gate DG
(n)
Alice.
– When DG
(n)
Alice =
DG
(n)
Bob we will say that Alice and Bob see and use the
same gate, which represents (in their truth-perspective) the canonical gate
DG(n).
On this basis, one can conclude that, generally, Alice sees a kind of “de-
formation” in Bob’s logical behavior.
In [7] some example have been discussed.
As another insightful example, consider the behavior of the controlled-not
gate described by the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Let Ta be the truth-perspective of an agent a.
If DXOR
(1,1)
Ta
= DXOR(1,1), then Ta = e
iθI.
Proof Suppose DXOR
(1,1)
Ta
= DXOR(1,1). One can easily show that:
(Ta ⊗ Ta)XOR(1,1) = XOR(1,1)(Ta ⊗ Ta). Consequently, by standard algebraic
calculations we obtain: Ta = e
iθI.
As a consequence, one immediately obtains that two agents a and b can see
and use the same XOR-gate only if their truth-perspectives Ta and Tb are
probabilistically equivalent.
Moreover, a relativistic way of thinking can also be applied to strong epis-
temic operations. Alice sees Bob using a phase-flip channel instead of a bit-flip
channel as strong epistemic operation. Similarly, some other agent sees Bob’s
strong epistemic operation acts as a bit-phase-flip channel.
From a logical point of view, examples of epistemic situations as the one
we have here investigated, can be formally reconstructed in the framework of a
quantum computational semantics (see [4]). Let us briefly recall the basic ideas
of this approach. We consider an epistemic quantum computational language
LEp consisting of:
– atomic sentences;
– logical connectives corresponding to the following gates: negation, Toffoli,
controlled-not, Hadamard and square root of negation;
– names for epistemic agents (say, Alice, Bob, ...);
– logical epistemic operators, corresponding to (generally irreversible) epis-
temic operations.
This language can express sentences like “Alice knows that Bob does not
know that the spin-value in the x-direction is up”. The semantics for LEp
provides a convenient notion of model, whose role is assigning informational
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meanings to all sentences. Technically, a model of LEp is defined as a map Mod
that associates to any truth-perspective T and to any sentence α a density
operator ρ = ModT(α), living in a Hilbert space Hα, whose dimension depends
on the linguistic complexity of α.
On this basis, one can give a natural definition for the concepts of truth
and of logical consequence in terms of the notions of T-probability (pT) and of
T-preorder (T):
– a sentence α is true with respect to a model Mod and to a truth-perspective
T (abbreviated as Mod,T α) iff pT(ModT(α)) = 1;
– a sentence β is a logical consequence of a sentence α (abbreviated as α  β)
iff for any model Mod and any truth-perspective T,
ModT(α) T ModT(β).
While truth is obviously dependent on the choice of a truth perspective
T, one can prove that the notion of logical consequence represents an absolute
relation that is invariant with respect to truth-perspective changes.
Theorem 8 [4]
α  β iff for any model Mod, ModI(α) I ModI(β), where I is the canonical
truth-perspective.
On this basis one can conclude that:
– Alice and Bob may have different ideas about the logical connectives, about
truth, falsity and probability.
– In spite of these differences, the reasoning-rules (which are determined
by the logical consequence relation) are the same for Alice and for Bob.
Apparently, assigning the same interpretation to the logical connectives is
not a necessary condition in order to use the same reasoning-rules.
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